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The Economic Consequences of 1997
XL. Wu*
YC. Jao**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with the economic consequences of the scheduled
transfer of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) in
1997 and the present and future economic relationship between Hong
Kong and China. We will begin by postulating several premises sche-
matically and then raise simple but fundamental questions. The three
premises are as follows.
(1) Two economies exist side by side with intimate contacts be-
tween their respective citizens for ethnic and geographical-and there-
fore also economic-reasons. One of the two, Hong Kong, is a highly
developed, internationally oriented, market economy. It is very small in
size and scantily endowed with natural resources. The PRC, on the
other hand, is a vast, populous and extremely poor country that tries to
project its economy on to a path of rapid development by modifying, but
without totally abandoning, its hitherto centrally administered system
which rests on public ownership and socialist principles of management
and practice and by partially relaxing its self-imposed semi-insulation
from the rest of the world.
(2) The two economies have thus far been under two different
political administrations, each being separate from the other on the basis
of independent sovereignty.
(3) Given these assumptions, there is little doubt that flows of
goods and services in both directions are bound to be quite high, espe-
cially as each economy's relative share in the other's total world trade
and flow of capital (which may be either high or low) tends to be domi-
nant at least in one direction-from the small developed economy to the
large less developed country striving to develop in the case of capital and
in the reverse direction in the case of exports.
Schematically, several points concerning the impact of develop-
ments in each country on the economy of the other can be raised. First,
* Professor of Economics, University of San Francisco; Consultant, Hoover Institution; Stan-
ford University.
** Reader in Economics, University of Hong Kong; Former Dean of the Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Hong Kong.
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L
there is no doubt that under the assumption of separateness in terms of
both political sovereignty and civil administration, the two economies
can enjoy prosperity simultaneously. Second, history has shown that
under the same legal and political framework, the small market system
can prosper even as the larger planned economy languishes or flounders
economically. This condition has prevailed during most years since the
founding of the PRC in 1949. Third, the opposite situation in which the
larger system enjoys prosperity while the small one is depressed has not
occurred once in the post-1949 period. This is theoretically conceivable,
however, since the latter is also dependent upon the rest of the world,
excluding China, and the other market economies may be the source of
depressive influence.
But what happens if we alter the assumption of separate sovereignty
and political administration? (A subsidiary question is whether political
administration can be kept separate while only sovereignty is nominally
transferred.) Under some such condition, the "question of simultaneous
prosperity" must be reexamined. If the large economy is prosperous in
this new legal-political framework, the small system, a priori, is likely
(albeit not necessarily) to do well, although doing well must not be
equated to doing better than before the legal change. But can the large
economy lanquish and flounder while the small one continues to prosper?
Will it then be able or be allowed to remain prosperous? The possibility
of a depressed Hong Kong and a very prosperous China is so unlikely
that we can leave it out in the interest of saving space.
II. BACKGROUND
The 1984 agreement to transfer sovereignty over Hong Kong from
the United Kingdom to the PRC in 1997 marks the first time since the
end of World War II that a free and economically highly developed terri-
tory is to be handed over to a communist state under a negotiated treaty.1
Before 1982, Hong Kong enjoyed the reputation of being one of the fast-
est growing economies in the world, a member of the four little dragons
of Asia. From a small entrep6t before World War II, Hong Kong had by
the mid-1960s transformed into an export-oriented industrial city-state.
Since the late 1960s, Hong Kong has emerged as a leading financial
center in the Asia-Pacific region.2 Hong Kong's per capita gross domes-
I Since the legal and political aspects of the impending transfer have been extensively treated
elsewhere, this Article is confined to an analysis of the economic implications and consequences.
For two recent collections of essays on the political, legal, economic, and social aspects of the Sino-
British agreement on Hong Kong, see HONG KONG AND 1997: STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE
(Y.C. Jao, C.K. Leung, P. Wesley-Smith, & S.L. Wong eds. 1985); THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG:
TOWARD 1997 AND BEYOND (H. Chiu, Y.C. Jao, & Y.L. Wu eds. 1987) [hereinafter THE FUTURE
OF HONG KoNc].
2 The literature of Hong Kong's postwar economic growth and metamorphosis is too vast to be
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tic product ("GDP"), measured at current prices and exchange rates,
increased by twenty-three times from about US$243 in 1947 to US$5,594
in 1981. This growth was achieved during a period when the population
of Hong Kong grew three-fold to 5.15 million. The average annual
growth rate of the economy in real terms was 8.7% from 1947 to 1981.
More recently from 1976 to 1981, this growth rate was 11.9%, arguably
one of the highest in the world.3 In 1985, according to World Bank sta-
tistics, Hong Kong's average per capita income was $6,230 (compared
with $310 for the PRO).4
Hopes that this brilliant record of economic growth and prosperity
could be sustained over the long run faded in 1982. When the severe
world economic recession caught up with Hong Kong in 1982, domestic
exports which normally provided the main impetus to growth actually
declined in volume. An even more portentous development occurred on
the political front when China set forth its demand for sovereignty over
all of Hong Kong-not just the New Territories, the lease of which ex-
pires in 1997. Officially confirmed during Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher's visit to Beijing in September 1982, this demand dealt a shat-
tering blow to public confidence in Hong Kong's future.' People became
increasingly apprehensive about the viability of the socio-economic sys-
tem, the protection of private property, and the respect for personal free-
dom and human rights consequent on a change in regimes.' The
diplomatic negotiations between Britain and China that began after
Thatcher's trip dragged on slowly under the shadow of China's threat
that it would announce a unilateral "solution" for Hong Kong if the bi-
lateral talks failed to produce an agreement by the end of September
1984.7
For a two-year period following the September 1982 Thatcher visit,
cited here. For an overview and extensive bibliography, see THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN
HONG KONG, (D. Lethbridge 2d ed. 1984) (essays include E.K.Y. Chen on the economy, Y.C. Jao
on financial structure, and C.L. Hung on foreign investment).
3 Jao, Economic Prospects after the Sino-British Agreement, in THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG,
supra note 1, at 57-58.
4 HONG KONG: CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT, 1966-1986 (1987) (for underlying data). Official estimates of national income of Hong
Kong date only from 1961. For earlier unofficial estimates, see E. SZCZEPANIK, THE ECONOMIC
GROWTH OF HONG KONG (1958); K.R. CHOU, THE HONG KONG ECONOMY (1966). See also
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 202-03 (1987).
5 Jao, supra note 3, at 58.
6 The apprehension is easily understandable in view of communist China's abysmal record in
human rights, especially during the Cultural Revolution, and also the fact that over half of Hong
Kong's population is first or second generation refugees from mainland China. Even in the post-
Mao period, when conditions are supposed to have improved considerably, China's human rights
record still falls far short of the standards common in civilized societies. For a documented study,
See J. COPPER, F. MICHAEL, & Y.L. Wu, HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-MAO CHINA (1985).
7 See F. CHING, HONG KONG AND CHINA: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE 22 (1985).
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Hong Kong was engulfed by a confidence crisis which at one stage nearly
destroyed the whole financial system. The prices of shares, land and real
properties fell in 1982 by 50-70% from their peaks in 1981.8 Erosion of
asset values and the escalation of bad debts resulted in many property
firms and financial institutions facing a severe liquidity squeeze. Those
especially hard hit were the less prudent banks and deposit-taking com-
panies ("DTCs") as demonstrated by the numerous failures and bank-
ruptcies. The fiscal system, which had grown accustomed to annual
budgetary surpluses, also fell on hard times. The 1982-83 fiscal year was
the first of three consecutive years of fiscal deficits of an unprecedented
size for Hong Kong, largely because of plummeting land sales as a result
of the depressed real estate sector. 9 The real growth rate of the economy
in 1982 dropped to 1.1% from 9.4% a year earlier.' 0 The Hong Kong
dollar faced heavy pressure from two sources: outright capital flight and
internal portfolio shift from domestic currency to foreign currency de-
nominated deposits."
The value of the Hong Kong dollar against the U.S. dollar fell re-
lentlessly from US$1.00=HK$5.69 at the end of 1981 to
US$1=HK$9.6 (a record low) on "Black Saturday," September 24,
1983. In response to the drop in value, many shops began to quote prices
in U.S. dollars and refused to accept payment in Hong Kong banknotes.
Panic buying of staples and imported items occurred, and rumors spread
quickly about the solvency of banks and DTCs. Faced with the threat of
an imminent breakdown of the financial system, in late September the
Hong Kong government took over the insolvent Hang Lung Bank, and
participated in a rescue operation for another local institution, the Sun
Hung Kai Bank. On October 15, 1983, the Hong Kong government set
forth a two point stabilization plan-a plan that local economists had
been advocating for some time. The first measure, of overriding impor-
tance, was the replacement of the floating exchange rate regime of 1974-
83 with a "linked exchange rate system," whereby the issue of banknotes
must be backed 100% by U.S. dollars at a fixed rate of
8 The Hang Seng index of stock prices (July 31, 1964) declined steadily from a July 1981 high
of 1,810.20 to 676.30 in Dec. 1982. The prices of land and properties, depending on locations, fell
50-90% from their 1980-81 peaks. See C.L. Wu, GOVERNMENT LAND SALES IN HONG KONG
(Hong Kong Economic Papers No. 17, forthcoming).
9 Jao, supra note 3, at 58-59. The deficits were HK$4,586 million, HK$8,197 million, and
HK$3,539 million for the three fiscal years 1982-83, 1983-84, and 1984-85 respectively, on a "con-
solidated" accounting basis. See H.K. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES, HONG KONG 1987,
314-17 [hereinafter HONG KONG 1987].
10 HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC SERVICES BRANCH, 1987 ECONOMIC PROSPECTS,
statistical app., table 3 [hereinafter 1987 ECONOMIC PROSPECTS].
I Jao, supra note 3, at 59.
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US$1.00=HK$7.8. 12 The other measure was the abolition of the 10%
withholding tax on interest income from Hong Kong dollar denominated
deposits with financial institutions.
13
The linked-rate system, despite initial confusion and skepticism, has
succeeded in saving the Hong Kong dollar from total collapse. With the
exception of a brief speculative attack in July 1984 after Deng Xiaoping's
much publicized insistence that Chinese troops must be stationed in
Hong Kong after 1997 and that a joint liaison group must be established
to monitor any Sino-British agreement, the Hong Kong dollar has held
remarkably steady against the U.S. dollar at the fixed rate of 7.8% with
fluctuations no more than 2% either way.14 The stability of the new
monetary system depends on full convertibility and the process of "arbi-
trage and competition," whereby any deviation from the officially prede-
termined rate can automatically generate market forces to restore
equilibrium. 15
Although the unprecedented financial crisis of 1982-83 had some
'economic origins (e.g., the excessive growth of money and credit in 1977-
81; the imprudence, mismanagement or even fraudulent practices of cer-
tain financial institutions; and the laxity with respect to prudential super-
vision), there can be little doubt that it was the pervasive anxiety and
apprehension over Hong Kong's future that made the crisis so severe and
threatening.1 6
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE 1984 AGREEMENT
A. Recovery of the Economy
Before 1982, the people of Hong Kong fondly, perhaps unthink-
ingly, hoped that post-Mao China would have the good sense, in view of
Hong Kong's usefulness to China, to let Hong Kong's status quo con-
tinue indefinitely by concluding a friendship pact with Britain to finesse
the 1997 issue.17 The PRC's intransigent stand on sovereignty, therefore,
12 For a fuller analysis, see Jao, The 1997 Issue and Hong Kong's Financial Crisis, 2 J. CHINESE
STUDIES 113 (1985).
13 Jao, supra note 3, at 59.
14 Jao, Hong Kong Dollar Looking for Political Parity, ASIAN BANKING, Sept. 1984, at 47-55.
15 Jac, supra note 3, at 59. For an exposition of the linked exchange rate system, see The
Stabilization of the Hong Kong Dollar, ASIAN MONETARY MONITOR, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 9-37;
Greenwood, The Monetary Framework Underlying the Hong Kong Dollar Stabilization Scheme,
CHINA Q., Sept. 1984, at 631-36.
16 In 1982-83, China's propaganda machine launched a strident campaign attacking Britain's
position that any agreement on Hong Kong's future must secure the consent of three parties,
namely, China, Britain, and Hong Kong. It also accused the British and Hong Kong governments
of engineering the currency crisis as a bargaining counter. These campaigns had an extremely unset-
tling effect on confidence and made the crisis worse than it would otherwise have been.
17 Public opinion polls taken in Hong Kong in 1982-83 showed that a majority of the respon-
1988]
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came as a great shock. During the initial stage of the negotiations, Brit-
ain tried to trade sovereignty for some form of British administration
beyond 1997, but even this was categorically rejected by China." In the
end, Britain had to give up both sovereignty and administration. This
was a great disappointment to the majority of the population. Moreover,
the agreement between Britain and China to hand over Hong Kong was
strictly a bilateral affair with no participation by the people of Hong
Kong at all.9 Nevertheless, the Joint Declaration initialed in September
1984 was still greeted with relief, though not enthusiasm, by the popula-
tion, who realized that the alternative, a unilateral "solution" proclaimed
by China, would be even worse. On paper, the Joint Declaration, which
promises a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong and the preservation
of its existing socio-economic system and life style, seems reasonable.
Moreover, the Joint Declaration also legitimizes British rule from 1984
to 1997. Given that the time span for economic decision making in Hong
Kong is short-normally 5-7 years-the Sino-British agreement insures a
period during which orderly planning for the future-including exit as
an ultimate alternative-can be made. Thus the acute confidence crisis
of 1982-84 gradually subsided, though it has by no means entirely
disappeared.
Against this background, the economy staged a recovery from the
trough of 1982. Credit for this recovery must be given to the "linked
exchange rate" system implemented since October 17, 1983, which as
mentioned earlier, succeeded in stopping the free fall of the Hong Kong
dollar. The stabilization of the currency enables entrepreneurs, business-
men, and other economic agents to carry on their normal economic ac-
tivities instead of devoting their time and energy to currency speculation.
After reaching its nadir of 57.2 on "Black Saturday," September 24,
1983, the trade-weighted exchange rate index steadily recovered-in line
with the extraordinary strength of the U.S. dollar in 1983-85-to 78.2 in
February 1985. (Table 1) After the U.S. dollar started weakening in
March 1985, the index also declined paripassu, but this did not give rise
to any panic as in 1982-83, since people realized that the depreciation
basically reflected problems of the U.S. economy.
Responding characteristically to the U.S.-led world economic recov-
ery, Hong Kong's exports rose sharply. Because the Hong Kong econ-
omy is export-oriented, the growth rate of GDP in real terms doubled to
6.5% in 1983 and rose further to 9.5% in 1984. In 1985, however, in a
delayed response to the strength of the Hong Kong dollar (as a mirror
dents favored the status quo. See HONG KONG: IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE, 75-109 (J.Y.S. Cheng
ed. 1984).
18 F. CHING, supra note 7, at 20-21.
19 See G. Hicks, Hong Kong on the Eve of Communist Takeover, in THE FUTURE OF HONG
KONG, supra note 1, at 23, 33-35.
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image of the U.S. dollar due to the peg), exports slumped and the real
growth rate plummeted to only 0.6%. After the U.S. dollar started
weakening in March 1985, Hong Kong's exports regained their competi-
tiveness, and the real growth rate of the economy in 1986 recovered once
more to 8.7%.
In 1987, although the Hong Kong government predicted a real
growth of 6.2% in its annual budget (presented in February), current
indications are that the real growth rate is likely to exceed 9%, again due
to the vigorous performance of the export sector. Meanwhile, mainly as
a result of currency stabilization, the annual inflation rate has fallen from
the double-digit to the single-digit level. The unemployment rate, an-
other leading indicator, also fell from 5.1% in March 1983 to 2.1% at
the end of 1986. (A summary of Hong Kong's macroeconomic perform-
ance in 1976-86 is given in Table 2.) Note that while the per capita GDP
measured in Hong Kong dollars registered an uninterrupted growth
throughout the period, the same variable denominated in U.S. dollars
declined in 1982 and 1983-reflecting of course the sharp depreciation of
the Hong Kong dollar during the currency crisis.
Another important pillar of the economy, the real estate sector, has
also been recovering from the slump of 1982-84. Since the market bot-
tomed out in 1984, residential property prices have risen by between 25
and 45% (depending on grade), and prices and rentals in the office sector
by 25 to 30%.20 Land prices have risen correspondingly. As a result,
government land sales have soared to such an extent that by the 1985-86
fiscal year a surplus was once again achieved, ending the fiscal crisis of
the previous three years.21 The tourist industry was, however, not af-
fected by the 1982-84 crisis at all: if anything, the depreciation of the
Hong Kong dollar has stimulated the increased number of incoming
tourists. Thus, the number of visitors increased annually from 1.56 mil-
lion in 1976 to 3.44 million in 1985, while their expenditures grew from
HK$3,888 million to HK$14,804 million during the same period.2 2
Finally, a popular short-term indicator of the state of confidence is
the index of stock prices. As shown in Table 3, the Hang Seng Index of
stock prices rose more than four times to 3,479.24 by the end of July
1987 after touching a low of 746.02 three years earlier, just two months
before the initialing of the Joint Declaration. The booming stock market
reflects not only the improving economy but also the growing integration
of world financial markets, as foreign institutional investors (mainly
those from the United Kingdom, United States and Japan) perceived that
20 See Hong Kong's Property Market-Greater Stability Likely, H.K. BANK ECONOMIC RE-
PORT, June 1987.
21 HONG KONG 1987, supra note 9, at 314-17.
22 H.K. TouRIsT ASSOCIATION, A STATISTICAL REVIEW OF TOURISM IN HONG KONG 44-47
(1985).
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Hong Kong stock prices were comparatively cheap in terms of their aver-
age price-earnings ratio and the depreciated Hong Kong dollar. How-
ever, Hong Kong's stock market is notoriously volatile and speculative.
Since foreign investors can come and go and sentiments change over-
night, the index of stock prices cannot be regarded as a reliable guide to
long-term trends.
B. Banking Crisis
Although the currency crisis was brought to an end by the stabiliza-
tion plan of October 1983, the banking crisis lingered on for a few more
years. The banking crisis began in November 1982 when the collapse of
the property market caused some "fringe banks" or deposit-taking com-
panies to founder. The government at that time did not, however, take
any direct measures to stabilize the banking sector. They preferred to
use the largest commercial bank, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, to serve as a de facto central bank. But when the currency
crisis reached its height and the whole financial system teetered on the
brink of total collapse, the government reversed its stand by taking on
the role of the lender of last resort on a massive scale. As mentioned
earlier, the Hong Kong government took over Hang Lung Bank and res-
cued Sun Hung Kai Bank in September 1983. Then in June 1985 it took
over the Overseas Trust Bank and its subsidiary, the Hong Kong Indus-
trial and Commercial Bank, when they could not meet their obligations,
by using the resources of its Exchange Fund. Between June 1985 and
January 1987, the authorities further intervened to save problem banks
either in the form of temporary administrative control and credit lines
(Union Bank and Hon Nin Bank), or guarantees for doubtful loans
(Wing On Bank and Ka Wah Bank). Eventually, Union Bank and Ka
Wah Bank were taken over by China-owned entities, Wing On Bank was
taken over by Hang Seng Bank, and Hon Nin Bank was taken over by
First Pacific Bank, owned by Indonesian Chinese. Space does not permit
an exhaustive analysis but some observations are in order.23
First, the banking crisis, lasting some four years and involving
scores of banks and quasi-banks, was unprecedented in its duration and
scale. While imprudence, mismanagement, and fraud probably would
have resulted in a shakeout anyway, what made the crisis so protracted
and intractable was the superimposition of political uncertainty that ex-
acerbated the disruptions to the underlying economy. Second, the Hong
Kong government's massive intervention seems at first glance at variance
23 For a fuller analysis of the banking crises, see Y.C. Jao, Recent Banking Crises in Hong Kong
and Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective, in CHINESE BANKING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
(M.K. Nyaw and C.Y. Chang eds. forthcoming). It is estimated that the Hong Kong government
spent about HK$5 billion (US$641 million) for the rescue operations.
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Table 3
Hang Seng Index of Stock Prices
(July 31, 1964=100)
End of Year/Month f Low Closing
1981 1,810.20 1,113.77 1,405.82
1982 1,445.32 676.30 783.82
1983 1,102.64 690.06 874.94
1984 1,206.83 746.02 1,200.38
1985 1,762.51 1,220.74 1,752.45
1986 2,568.30 1,559.94 2,568.30
1987
January 2,614.87 2,449.88 2,553.25
February 2,879.01 2,585.22 2,877.87
March 2,939.05 2,629.28 2,713.81
April 2,785.47 2,589.54 2,659.85
May 2,949.06 2,685.37 2,919.70
June 3,178.98 2,934.19 3,178.19
July 3,479.24 3,207.21 3,479.24
with its traditional laissez faire philosophy. Only a little reflection is
needed, however, for one to realize that the government's hand was
forced by the new political reality. Had the Hong Kong government not
used its Exchange Fund-whose primary function is to protect the integ-
rity of the currency-to rescue problem banks and arrange deals accepta-
ble to all the parties concerned, it would have been accused of sabotaging
the Sino-British agreement and deliberately undermining Hong Kong's
"stability and prosperity." This conjecture gains credence when one re-
calls that during a previous banking crisis in 1965, the government did
not spend a cent of the Exchange Fund for bailing out banks, but relied
mainly on the two note-issuing banks (the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank) as a kind of surrogate
lender of last resort.24
C. Portfolio Shift
Since the confidence crisis erupted in 1982, anecdotes of capital
flight from Hong Kong have been regularly featured in the popular press
of Australia, Canada, and the United States-the three countries which
admit most of the emigrants from Hong Kong. However, there has been
no systematic quantification of such capital flight due largely to the lack
of a comprehensive balance of payments accounting system in Hong
24 See Y. C. JAo, BANKING AND CURRENCY IN HONG KONG 235-69 (1974).
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Kong.25 Previous attempts to tackle the problem have failed to yield any
plausible estimate. 26 Moreover, even when an official balance of pay-
ments accounting system exists, it is well known that many transactions
escape official monitoring and therefore are not recorded. There is also
the conceptual problem of defining precisely what is capital flight, since
the distinction between capital flight and foreign investment is not always
clear-cut.27
A less obvious form of capital flight, namely, internal portfolio shift,
can however be fully documented. This takes the form of switching from
domestic currency denominated to foreign currency denominated depos-
its within the banking system. Banking data show that in 1980 foreign
currency denominated deposits in all depository institutions accounted
for only 13.8% of total deposits, but by the end of 1983 the proportion
had shot up to 47.5%. (This was the year, it may be recalled, of the great
currency crisis.) The linked exchange rate system established in October
1983 could not entirely prevent portfolio shift, for the proportion of for-
eign currency denominated deposits continued to rise to 56.4% by the
end of 1986.28 But it did succeed in slowing the pace of portfolio shift
and in enabling such shift to take place without causing a currency crisis
at the same time.
The portfolio shift as shown in the raw banking data may, however,
have overstated the foreign currency component of total deposits due to
two effects. The first is the "valuation effect." This arises because the
government statistics are all expressed in Hong Kong dollars, yet the
depreciation of the local currency automatically inflates the value of for-
eign currency denominated deposits. The second is the "swap deposit"
effect. A swap deposit is one where a customer deposits a sum of foreign
currency with a financial institution, and then immediately enters into an
agreement with that institution to receive repayment in Hong Kong dol-
lars at an agreed forward rate of exchange. At present, such deposits are
classified as foreign currency denominated deposits, but many econo-
25 The Hong Kong government publishes only a "visible and invisible trade account," but not a
"capital account." See 1987 ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 10, statistical app., table 4.
26 According to Hong Kong's former Deputy Secretary for Monetary Affairs, "there is suffi-
cient evidence to support the view that there has been an increased outflow of certain types of capi-
tal" in 1982-84, though he did not quantify it. See Latter, Changing Patterns of External Flows,
(paper presented to the Hong Kong Management Association, Aug. 22, 1984); L. Cheng, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Capital Flight in Hong Kong, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 683 (1985) (The title of
the Cheng article is, however, rather misleading since it is largely a descriptive account of Hong
Kong's economic situation in 1982-84, based on secondary sources, without any quantitative esti-
mate of capital flight.).
27 See CUDDINGTON, CAPITAL FLIGHT: ESTIMATES, ISSUES, AND EXPLANATIONS (Princeton
Studies in International Finance No. 58, Dec. 1986); Khan & Haque, Capital Flight from Developing
Countries, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1987, at 2-5.
28 For underlying data, see Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics.
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mists argue that they should be more properly classified as domestic cur-
rency denominated deposits. Proper classification depends upon the
future intention of the depositor.
To eliminate these distortions, standard methods can be used to ad-
just the raw data.29 (Table 4) It will be seen that, even after adjustment,
the foreign currency components of the balance sheet structure of all de-
pository institutions still show an unmistakable upturn. Thus, foreign
currency denominated deposits rose steadily from 9.2% in 1980 to
42.4% in 1986.
What are the motivations for this portfolio behavior? The conven-
tional explanation in terms of factors such as Hong Kong's rising stature
as a financial center, interest rate arbitrage, etc. which is, in our view,
grossly inadequate. We submit that anxiety and uncertainty about the
future is perhaps the most significant factor, without denying that other
factors may also be relevant, especially in the short run. First, holding
foreign currency denominated deposits enables one to hedge against the
possibility that the Hong Kong dollar might become worthless after
1997. Second, if such deposits are held with branches of foreign banks,
they are as good as deposits held abroad, since it is a well-established
principle in international banking that the parent bank is responsible for
the liabilities of its branches to an unlimited extent.
D. Stagnant Capital Formatibn
Another macroeconomic indicator which has given rise to concern
is Hong Kong's gross domestic fixed capital formation. As shown in Ta-
ble 5, although in nominal terms (at current prices) gross capital forma-
tion increased by 10.2% between 1982 and 1986, in real terms (at
constant 1980 prices) it actually fell by 3%. It will be readily seen that
the principal culprit for the stagnant state of capital formation is building
and construction, which during the same period declined by 2.2% in
nominal terms and by 14.2% in real terms, a phenomenon reflecting the
depression in the real estate market in 1982-84 as a result of the confi-
dence crisis. Whether the current recovery of the property market will
lead to a sustained rise in building and construction activity remains to
be seen. A more comforting thought is that plant, machinery and equip-
ment which reflect largely investment in the manufacturing industries
increased by 67.7% in nominal terms and by 20.8% in real terms be-
tween 1982 and 1986. This indicates that Hong Kong's export expansion
can still generate positive investment in the industrial sector. However,
the increase may be in foreign ownership, and these growth rates repre-
29 First, we readjust the banking data with respect to deposits by assuming that the exchange
rate index during the relevant period had not changed. Second, we reclassify "swap deposits" as
domestic currency denominated deposits.
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Table 5
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation in Hong Kong
(million Hong Kong dollars)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
At current prices:
Gross Domestic fixed
capital formation
Transfer costs
Building and
construction
Developmers' margin
Plant, machinery
and equipment
At constant (1980) prices:
Gross domestic fixed
capital formation
Transfer costs
Building and
construction
Developers' margin
Plant, machinery
and equipment
57,858
1,601
51,868
1,262
55,578
1,373
54,706
2,064
63,779
2,723
24,787 25,112 24,414 22,802 24,243
14,482 7,200 6,369 6,951 8,318
16,988 18,294 23,422 22,889 28,495
50,414
1,517
46,197
1,433
46,928
1,429
45,807
2,046
48,892
2,654
20,417 20,373 19,110 17,508 17,524
14,958 11,385 10,900 11,095 12,385
13,522 13,006 15,489 15,158 16,329
Source: Hong Kong Government Economic Services Branch, 1987 Economic Prospects,
Statistical Appendix, Table 2.
sent a significant slowdown when compared with those of an earlier pe-
riod: between 1976 and 1981 plant, machinery and equipment increased
by 274.5% in nominal terms and 154.2% in real terms. The annual
growth rates in the more recent period were lower by some thirty-seven
percentage points in real terms. Again, in the absence of political uncer-
tainty, such a sharp slowdown would have been inexplicable on economic
grounds alone.
E. Precautionary Relocation and Diversification
The confidence crisis and the impending transfer of sovereignty have
inevitably affected the strategic decisions of firms regarding their future.
While most firms, especially the largest and most prestigious ones, pub-
licly profess their faith in the Joint Declaration and deny any intention of
leaving Hong Kong, their private actions indicate otherwise. Locally in-
corporated firms, in particular, are much less sanguine about their long-
term future than their foreign incorporated counterparts for quite obvi-
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ous reasons. In recent years, therefore, they have followed what may be
called a strategy of "precautionary relocation or diversification." This
strategy may take many forms. Relocation may be pursued separately
from or together with diversification, but the essential elements are the
same: (a) removal of the registered head office from Hong Kong to a
foreign country, especially a tax haven; (b) establishment of branches or
offices in foreign countries, or acquisition of foreign firms in whole or in
part; (c) sale of the firm's equity to a foreign firm, or formation of a joint
venture with a foreign firm in Hong Kong; and (d) transfer of liquid
assets abroad leaving only sufficient money balances for transaction pur-
poses in Hong Kong.
The most sensational cases of relocation are the decision by the old-
est British conglomerate, Jardine Matheson, to move its legal domicile to
Bermuda in March 1984, and the giant Sing Tao publishing group's
transfer of its ownership to an Australian holding company in May
1985.30 Undoubtedly there are numerous other cases that have escaped
media attention. The most prominent case of "precautionary diversifica-
tion" is that of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
("HSBC"), a British bank founded and incorporated in Hong Kong in
1864. Because it is also Hong Kong's de facto central bank, it cannot
move its head office elsewhere without causing immediate financial panic.
This need for caution, however, has not prevented it from embarking on
a global diversification. In 1980 the HSBC acquired 51% control of
Marine Midland Bank of the United States, and in July 1987, it offered to
purchase the remaining 49% of the same bank. Although a 1981 at-
tempt to acquire the Royal Bank of Scotland was vetoed by the British
Monopoly and Merger Commission, the HSBC did not slacken its pro-
grams of overseas acquisition and expansion. Thus in 1985, it acquired
James Capel, a leading London brokerage house, four New York City
branches of the failed Golden Pacific National Bank, and all the branches
of the failed Canadian Commercial Bank. Between July 1985 and June
1986, the HSBC raised a capital fund of US$11.2 billion in international
financial markets by issuing primary capital undated floating rate notes,
for the purpose of further acquisitions-most probably in the United
Kingdom or Europe. Because the HSBC in 1985 still derived about 70%
of its total profits from Hong Kong, it will not abandon the territory
overnight, but clearly its ultimate aim is to diversify to such an extent
that it can survive as an international bank even if it loses its Hong Kong
interests entirely after 1997.31 Other notable cases of precautionary di-
30 Jardine's Holding Company Quits Hong Kong, S. China Morning Post (Hong Kong), Mar.
29, 1984; Sing Tao's Assets Set To Go Down Under, S. China Morning Post, May 23, 1985.
31 For a detailed analysis of the policy and strategy of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, see Jao, The Hong Kong Banking Group, in JAO & Ho, THE MAJOR BANKING GROUPS
IN HONG KONG AND THEIR FUTURE, ch. 2 (1987).
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versification are property tycoon Li Ka-shing's acquisition of 52% of
Husky Oil Ltd. of Calgary worth C$484 million, and shipping tycoon Sir
Yue-kong Pao's acquisition of about 15% of the stock of the Standard
Chartered Bank of Britain during a takeover battle for that bank in July
1986.32
F. Emigration of Managers, Technicians and Entrepreneurs
Along with capital flight and the relocation of businesses, large
numbers of entrepreneurs, managers, professionals and technicians have
begun to emigrate from Hong Kong. The most popular destinations are
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The immigra-
tion quotas of these countries set the limits. The United Kingdom has
effectively banned emigration from Hong Kong through its Nationality
Act, though there is a widespread rumor that a secret deal has been
struck to admit the top elite, such as senior government officials and po-
lice officers, members of the Executive Council and Legislative Council,
etc., should circumstances warrant such a step after 1997. The PRC's
interference in the matter of direct elections mentioned in the next sec-
tion and its apparent disregard of Hong Kong's public opposition to the
construction of a nuclear power plant on the border are cited as examples
that seem to presage worse things to come.33
Our analysis of the lingering banking crisis, stagnant capital forma-
tion, continuing portfolio shift and precautionary relocation or diversifi-
cation, and emigration of the elite illustrates that, despite the recent
boom in the economy and the stock market, a deep-seated uncertainty
over the long-term future still remains. In any case, there is no justifica-
tion for extrapolating the recent short-term upsurge into the more distant
future, bearing in mind that Hong Kong's average business planning ho-
rizon spans have been from five to seven years.
IV. ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE PRC AND
PRC-HoNG KONG RELATIONS
The question we face is whether the PRC economy can develop
steadily, if not at an accelerated rate, in the next decade 34 and beyond
1997 under current reform policies.
32 Reguly, The Hong Kong Links, The Financial Post (Canada), May 11-17, 1987; Truell, Pao,
Other Asian Investors Sink Lloyds Standard Bid, Asian Wall St. J. (Hong Kong), July 14, 1986.
33 HONG KONG ECON. J., Aug. 1987, at 50-52.
34 For an expanded discussion of this subject, see Wu, Planners and Entrepreneurs in the PRC:
Sources of Systemic Instability and Their Political Implications, ASIAN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1981, at
31-49. See also Wu, The Rocky Road of Bejing's Economic Reform: Can Trial and Error Lead to
Dynamic Equilibrium?, 4 J. N.E. ASIAN STUDiEs 3 (Fall 1985).
1988]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
A. Goals and Measures of Reform
In general, the desired goals of reform are to correct the devastating
economic and general consequences of Maoist policies which became ap-
parent after the coup which overthrew Mao's immediate successors (the
so-called gang-of-four led by Mao's radical widow, Jiang Qing) in 1976.
Since Maoist policies had aggravated the extreme poverty of the popula-
tion-the worst sufferers being the farmers and those living in the least
developed areas of the country--one of the first sharp turns in policy was
aimed at increasing general personal consumption and farm income. To
accomplish this objective, the responsibility system was established
whereby farm households were allowed to decide what crops they would
plant, to deliver their sales quotas (after taxes) to the state at better prices
than before, and to retain the remaining output and dispose of it more
freely. This was followed subsequently by scrapping the commune sys-
tem, the epitome of Maoist collectivization which had completely elimi-
nated private property ownership.35
Second, reform was urgently needed because resources were being
wasted through overproduction of goods not in demand and defective
products. Overemphasis on investment project starts, attempts to pro-
duce too much in capital rather than consumer goods, and use of quanti-
tative indicators in enterprise management and the provision of
incentives were inherent problems of centralist planning shared by the
Soviet and Eastern European economies. 36 The corrective policies, intro-
duced piecemeal and to different degrees, included: an attempt to cut
back on investment, selective curtailment of public sector consumption
(notably military manpower expenditure37), price reform by partial read-
justment or abolition of government-set prices, greater use of a bonus
system and widening of income differentials to enhance both worker and
management productivity, and giving enterprise managers greater power
over the work force.
Reform was needed to reduce the rigidity and lethargy of the bu-
reaucratic and over-centralized system and practice in economic plan-
ning and administration that were originally imported from the Soviet
Union but had become an integral part of the PRC's own political and
economic culture. The reformers' solution was decentralization, al-
lowing individual enterprises greater leeway in decision-making and,
35 See PRYBYLA, READJUSTMENT AND REFORM IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY, 1-58 (Occa-
sional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 2 1981); Prybyla, Economic De-
velopments in the Mainland, in SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA (MAINLAND) AND
TAIWAN, 1985-1986 49-71 (Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No.
2, H. Chiu ed. 1987).
36 See M. BORNSTEIN, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 188-241 (5th ed. 1985).
37 According to one report, 400,000 of the one million men were demobilized. WENT'I YU
YENCHIU (Issues and Studies), Apr. 1987, at 5.
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within the public sector, giving provincial and selected local governments
and agencies greater power to make production, trade and investment
decisions.
Reform also was necessary in order to increase employment oppor-
tunities for the still expanding labor force, laid off government and public
sector employees (including demobilized soldiers), and persons returning
from involuntary exile. The partial opening of the service industry to
private proprietors in both rural and urban areas became the reform solu-
tion of the early 1980s.
Furthermore, economic decision making needs were placed in more
competent hands. Technocrats were first recalled from exile. In this
area the slogan of "political reform" has assumed increasing importance
since 1986 and in reality entails administrative personnel changes that
would remove "communist party hacks" (euphemistically, guardians of
the faith) from positions of influence at all levels of economic administra-
tion and management.
Externally, economic reform has been pursued to raise productivity
through inward transfers of technology and capital imports. Exports are
promoted to increase the ability to import, and efforts are made to meet
the demands of foreign investors and lenders.
B. Policy Vacillations and Confusion
Students of Chinese affairs, press reporters and occasional observers
have been exposed to and become aware of various outward expressions
of 1) policy measures that can be classified under some of the preceding
reform categories and 2) outcomes of these policies and their interac-
tions. One's impressions differ depending upon what one sees and reads,
and misinterpretations occur. PRC authorities themselves often seem to
misinterpret the results of their own policies because of: their ideological
heritage and predilections as well as their inadequate understanding of
how "economic levers" instead of administrative commands are sup-
posed to work in a system that for more than thirty years had muddled
along, first under socialist planning and, later Maoist fantasy and disor-
dered thinking.38
C. Perceptions and Reality
Those who would like to see the transformation of the PRC system
38 Among the characteristics of Maoist economic policy was Mao's overwhelming emphasis on
nominative, rather than material incentives, and his belief in the net benefit of an increasing popula-
tion, the unending possibility of substituting labor for capital, and the inventiveness of the revolu-
tionary class steeped in communist ideology and Mao's own teachings, which can replace
conventional education and technical training. Application of these ideas to the Chinese economy
led to disastrous results in 1958-61 and 1966-76.
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into a predominantly market economy can find various measures of re-
form as benchmarks in an evolving progress. Among these benchmarks
are the abandonment of the commune system and the partial restoration
of private farming. The stipulation of private proprietorship as an enter-
prise form in the preliminary outline of the Civil Code promulgated in
April 1986'9 might seem to foreshadow the restoration of full scale pri-
vate ownership of property although thus far private property rights are
limited to the right of use. The announcement in the Seventh Five Year
Plan (1986-1990) that market pricing would be extended to an increasing
number of commodities may point to increasing use of economic indica-
tors in resource allocation and enterprise management.
For foreign observers interested in seeing a more liberalized Chinese
economy and its effects on the PRC as a market and recipient of foreign
capital and technology there have been equally tantalizing developments.
Among the latter are the formation of the special economic zones-
within which practices of the command economy have been relaxed to a
greater extent-the adoption of a Chinese-foreign joint venture law; the
negotiation of bilateral commercial and investment treaties with foreign
countries; the invitation to international oil companies to bid for off-
shore exploration rights; the visit of members of the New York Stock
Exchange in 1986 to talk about securities issues; increased borrowing
from foreign governments and commercial banks; decentralization of im-
port and export negotiations, etc. Yet beauty lies in the eyes of the be-
holder. To some observers these are unmistakable indications of
"liberalization" which, for persons willing to take another giant mental
leap, is then identified with political democratization. On the other
hand, to those who are more skeptical, and among them are many seri-
ous long-time students of Chinese Communist affairs, there are unfortu-
nately equally valid signs of changes in the reverse direction. In addition
to policy hesitations and reversals, it must be noted that most of the re-
form measures have tended to be limited in scope, restricted in their geo-
graphical application, and therefore experimental in nature. They have
either not been applied in earnest or have been adopted singly without
the mutually supporting elements that are necessary for meaningful
change.
Especially disturbing have been the periodic renewal of political
campaigns that negate previous reform: notably the 1983 campaign
against "spiritual pollution" and the campaign against "bourgeois liber-
alization" which began in the spring of 1987 and was heralded by the fall
39 Article 75 provides in pertinent part: "Individual property of a citizen shall include...
means of production and other lawful property permitted by law to be owned by a citizen." The
General Rules of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 75 (adopted by the 4th Sess.
of the 6th National People's Congress, Apr. 12, 1986), reprinted in COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND
TRADE LAWS: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (0. Nee ed. 1987) (binder III).
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of Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping's hand-picked Secretary-General of the
Chinese Communist Party. A careful examination of these anti-reform
campaigns shows that the PRC leadership is honeycombed by political
factions not at all anxious to see the full-scale consequences of the eco-
nomic reform outlined. Many do not seem to understand that individual
reform measures require continuing adjustment of the system so that
they will really work.' Lack of coordination between government
spending and decentralization of control over investment and production
have led to price inflation. This is then treated, on the one hand, as the
result of economic crime and speculation; on the other hand, it becomes
a source of complaint about income inequality and social unrest. Many
other examples can be cited to demonstrate such misinterpretations and
misunderstandings.
D. Fluctuations and Unsteady Growth
Empirical evidence since 1976 suggests that the PRC economy at
this stage of change can be described as a model of fluctuations which at
best is one of unsteady growth. At worst, one should not be surprised to
see fluctuations of greater amplitude that result occasionally in absolute
declines. (Statistical problems of output valuation, however, make mea-
surement in real terms not really meaningful under current conditions of
reporting and of pricing.)
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we can discern three com-
ponent elements in the reform process each of which can produce a cycle
of output change. First, the emergence and expansion of an unplanned
sector (which may or may not be private) alongside the planned state
sector will lead to the shift of resources, especially in an economy of
shortages and bottlenecks, away from the state sector. Because the de-
centralized sector is more efficient and nimble than the state sector, reali-
zation of the existence of this problem occurs only after the resource
redirection has already gone quite far. (The observed phenomena are
delays and unfinished state projects, black market prices, corruption of
public officials and illegal means to obtain materials in short supply, etc.)
The reaction by the authorities is to clamp down on the decentralized
sector, which then produces an "upper turning point" in the upswing
phase of the growth cycle initiated by decentralization of decision
making.
40 For instance, in order to increase the supply of consumer goods by enterprises working
under a new material incentive system, the prices of the products must be allowed to rise. Rising
prices must then be permitted to lead to an increase in workers and materials used in production.
This implies permission for workers to change jobs, factories to expand payroll, and for managers to
redirect investment, raise more capital-maybe at the expense of the public sector-and deal directly
with suppliers and buyers, etc. But some of these additional changes are often not permitted by
administrative commands.
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Second, the effort to allow personal income and consumption to rise
at unequal rates for different individuals and groups- and in different
parts of the country-leads of course to greater actual income differen-
tials. This creates changing expectations and consumption patterns and
styles, especially when viewed against nearly forty years of egalitarianism
in poverty. These new "inequalities" are grist in the ideological mill of
orthodox communists like Peng Zhen and Chen Yun-to mention but
two prominent names. Political ferment is fanned by popular complaints
about inflation, and economic and other "crimes." When such ferment
reaches a boiling point in policy struggle, the upper turning point in an-
other sub-cycle is reached.
Third, after the downfall of the Maoist leadership, the initial person-
nel shifts were at the expense of the Maoists. However, by 1985 and
especially in 1986 when further reform required the removal of incompe-
tent party cadres from economic control and management positions, the
vested interests of many non-Maoist party and administrative bureau-
crats (including those in the military) were at stake. One can therefore
think in terms of a sub-cycle of personnel changes between political
power holders and "technocrats" (including new and old "intellectuals"
co-opted into the party) whose fight for privilege and access to power and
goods will indirectly impact the performance of the economy.
The three sub-cycles in practice interact with one another and the
aggregate result not only reflects the outcome of such interaction but also
depends on the length and intensity of the upswings and downswings.
To these cyclical influences on the PRC economy, we must add both 1)
trend factors, notably changes in the number and quality (including the
skill and technological level) of the population and labor force and the
condition of resource availability through soil erosion, infrastructure de-
terioration, etc., and 2) exogenous shocks and influences (e.g., leadership
change through generational change, availability of foreign aid, major
world oil price shifts, etc.). A major disappointment in Chinese plans for
Hong Kong could well be regarded as such an external shock.
E. The Relationship between the Hong Kong and the Chinese
Economies
It follows from the above that continuous prosperity in China based
on steady growth cannot be depended upon in the foreseeable future,
certainly within the next several years when the current sub-cycles will
have run their course. In addition, a major shock in the form of the
departure of Deng Xiaoping from the active political scene is bound to
occur. At age 83, Deng's active political years probably will end before
1997. Whether his successor(s) can consolidate power before that date
remains to be seen.
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The more realfstic scenario to address PRC-Hong Kong relations
will therefore correspond to the situation of a slow growing, if not actu-
ally floundering and depressed, PRC economy side by side with a far
more prosperous Hong Kong. If such a situation occurs after the 1997
transition, or even before the practical transition prior to the legal date in
1997, what will happen to Hong Kong? The crux of the issue focuses on
what benefit the PRC hopes to derive from Hong Kong when the Chi-
nese economy is in distress and what other functions Hong Kong might
perform for Beijing, irrespective of the ruling Chinese faction(s) at that
time. In a nutshell, the benefit sought is an increased transfer of re-
sources to China (including free foreign exchange and access to it) or, in
the alternative, a safe haven in Hong Kong for those out of luck in China
at that time. Assuming a PRC economy in distress, a firm authoritarian
Chinese government would focus on taking more assets out of Hong
Kong. Alternatively, under a weak Chinese central government, Hong
Kong's function as a refuge for money and people from China would
appear more desirable in some Chinese eyes. However, given Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong, this function can no longer be performed
by Hong Kong openly as was often the case in days of yore. What has
happened between Hong Kong and China as well as what the PRC has
tried to accomplish in Hong Kong since 1984 must therefore be ex-
amined from this perspective.
In general, it appears that the PRC has been busy on two counts: 1)
bolstering Hong Kong whenever really necessary in order to preserve
Hong Kong's economic prospects for the takeover ten years hence and 2)
making sure that in the future Hong Kong will actually be governed by a
pliable and obedient administration free from interference of potentially
obstructionist local political interests. To insure that the second objec-
tive will be satisfied, the PRC has found it necessary to do things in and
to present-day Hong Kong that makes its post-1997 prospects more
grim. Even the pre-1997 objective of keeping Hong Kong viable may
occasionally entail a high cost to the PRC.
The increased transfer of communist cadres to Hong Kong is one of
the major PRC-initiated developments in its economic relations with
Hong Kong in recent years. For example, the Xinhua (New China)
News Agency, the PRC's defacto diplomatic mission in Hong Kong, has
a staff of about 700.41 The number of PRC controlled enterprises in
Hong Kong has been stated as over 3,00042 although another calculation
determined that Guangdong Province alone had more than 2,000 govern-
mental agencies stationed in Hong Kong in 1986.13 Overall legal immi-
41 Ming Pao, Aug. 3, 1987.
42 Id.
43 Report delivered at a 1987 Guangdong Provincial People's Congress meeting.
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gration from China to Hong Kong has increased to over 221,000 persons
in 1986, nearly doubling the total in 1983. 4 This total includes persons
placed in Hong Kong business, financial, and professional organizations
(including legal and accounting firms) to learn how the Hong Kong
economy operates. The procedure resembles the steps taken prior to the
establishment of tight central government control over Shanghai in the
1950s.
Along with the influx of personnel, Chinese capital investment in
Hong Kong has also increased. This growth of capital commitment is
mirrored in the multiplication of Chinese-controlled firms. Indeed, cases
of financial investment-for instance, in banking and acquiring failing
banks-has been mentioned earlier. Understandably, ferreting out de-
tails in such cases would be difficult, but the question of who will con-
tinue to provide backing in future banking and currency crises when the
Hong Kong government's Exchange Fund is no longer able or willing to
intervene has yet to be answered.
The influx of the PRC's own funds to provide support for the Hong
Kong economy may not be in the overall interest of the Chinese balance
of payments and may turn out to be an unexpected economic cost. The
placement of PRC personnel in Hong Kong for future supervisory work
seems to be an unavoidable step preparatory to the 1997 transfer of sov-
ereignty. The most current exercise of overt intervention has followed
the appearance of the Hong Kong government's Green Paper in May
19874" which outlines the several alternative forms of developing local
representation. The Deputy Chief of the Hong Kong-Macao Office in
the Beijing central government came out at first with an unequivocal ob-
jection to the direct election of members to the Legislative Council pro-
posed as an alternative in the Green Paper. But the statement was
subsequently retracted when it encountered a storm of protest.46 This,
however, is just one indication of the growing attempt to exercise influ-
ence that would make control after 1997 more effective and complete.
To Hong Kong residents the main concern is the nature of the PRC's
control once the power to exercise it has been established.
V. CONCLUSION
In view of the preceding analysis, it is plausible to argue that the
case of simultaneous and growing prosperity after 1997 for both Hong
44 See Ming Pao (Hong Kong), Aug. 3, 1987 (full report on P.R.C. immigrants and business in
Hong Kong).
45 H.K. GOVERNMENT, GREEN PAPER: THE 1987 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN REPRE-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (May 1987).
46 For commentaries and also reports on discussions at the University of Hong Kong, see Wah
Kiu Yat Po (Hong Kong), June 25, 1987; Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), June 23, 1987; S. China
Morning Post, June 23, 1987.
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Kong and China is not the most probable scenario for Hong Kong,
although given a loss of prosperity Hong Kong can no longer be expected
to continue as a major international financial center even if manufactur-
ing and trading activities continue. A strong Chinese central government
or even a strong Guangdong provincial authority in fiscal need may press
Hong Kong to make special contributions that can vary from taxation to
"voluntary" donations, and jacked-up export prices for water and power.
In the event of a weakened PRC central government and the emer-
gence of persons in China anxious either to find refuge in Hong Kong or
to exploit access to foreign markets Hong Kong still possesses at that
time, it is not inconceivable that underground Hong Kong-China eco-
nomic relations may develop. But this is hardly the kind of mutual pros-
perity one normally envisages.47
47 A number of reports on collusive activities involving Hong Kong residents and P.R.C. offi-
cials and their families have appeared in Hong Kong recently. See TIDE MONTHLY (Hong Kong),
June 15, 1987, at 43-44.

